The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Robbed: Inequality in U.S. Criminal Victimization, 1974–2000 by Thacher, David
The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Robbed:
Inequality in U.S. Criminal Victimization, 1974–2000
David Thacher1,2
This paper investigates inequality in criminal victimization in the United States
over the past quarter century. By analyzing data from the National Crime Vic-
timization Survey, it shows that the crime drop since the early 1970s has benefited
upper-income households much more than the poor, so that criminal victimiza-
tion has become more concentrated among the poor (particularly in the area of
nonstranger violence). The paper then decomposes this trend statistically in order
to investigate factors that may explain it. That analysis finds that demographic
changes in each quintile explain a significant share of the growing concentration
of criminal victimization among the poor.
KEY WORDS: crime victimization; inequality; stratification; demographic
change.
1. INTRODUCTION
Research about criminal victimization has repeatedly found that the
burdens of crime are distributed unequally across different social groups,
including race and class. Nearly all of this research has been cross-sectional,
aiming to describe and explain variation in victimization risk across social
groups at a single point in time; to date, criminologists have not systemat-
ically investigated how and why the distribution of victimization across
groups has changed over time (Meier and Miethe, 1993, p. 470; but see
Levitt, 1999a; Trickett, et al., 1995). In this paper, I will show that this kind
of longitudinal analysis reveals a largely unnoticed trend in criminal vic-
timization: Since the 1970s, U.S. criminal victimization has become mark-
edly more concentrated in the poorest economic groups, as the overall drop
in crime since 1974 has benefited upper-income households much more than
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it has benefited the poor. By decomposing this trend statistically, I show that
a large share of this distributional change has been driven by demographic
changes within each economic group.
Longitudinal analysis of this kind is important for a number of reasons.
First, the study of trends over time can help to integrate victimization lit-
erature with broader sociological concerns about inequality and stratifica-
tion, which have often focused on the historical growth in social inequality.
For example, studies of income inequality (e.g. Levy and Murnane, 1992)
and inequalities in health (e.g. Pappas et al., 1993) have often tried to de-
scribe and explain the growth of inequality in these spheres over time. An
important question, largely neglected by both the victimization literature and
the broader literature about social inequality and stratification, is whether
the distribution of criminal victimization has reinforced these trends in other
areas of social life. Second, when studying the distribution of a social burden
like criminal victimization, it is difficult to interpret the significance of a given
level inequality without knowing whether it is higher or lower than it was in
the past (Wagstaff et al., 1989, pp. 89–90). An equal distribution of crime is
almost certainly unattainable (there may even be normative reasons why it is
an inappropriate ideal, as discussed below), but large increases in the con-
centration of crime among the poor are at least prima facie cause for concern.
Finally, from a theoretical perspective, it is not generally the case that the
factors that influence cross-sectional variation will explain variation over
time, so the study of longitudinal trends in victimization inequality represents
a distinctive and unexplored topic for theorizing.
It is particularly appropriate to focus on victimization inequality across
economic groups because inequality in the distribution of any social burden is
of greatest concern when it exacerbates the inequalities that accumulate in
other spheres of life (Walzer, 1973; Barr and Pease,1990; Miller, 1995).3
3In general, victimization research has not focused directly on inequality across economic
groups because its goal only indirectly involves distribution. For example, routine activities
theorists investigate the distribution of victimization across social groups not because it is
thought to be important in itself but in order to identify factors that drive overall levels of
crime in society (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Consequently, this research has investigated dis-
tribution across social groups defined by characteristics thought to be most important in
affecting the risk of crime rather than characteristics that are thought to be normatively
significant in themselves (i.e. those that reflect important axes that separate the advantaged
from the disadvantaged). In practice, of course, there is much overlap between these two
principles for the definition of social groups. The point is simply that because of its specific
(and entirely appropriate) scholarly goals, routine activities research has not systematically
focused on the question of whether inequalities in the distribution of crime exacerbate
inequalities of other origins. Similarly, Trickett, et al. (1995) study of how the geographic
distribution of crime victimization in Britain changed during the 1980s was designed to address
important issues in the literature about geography and crime rather than the normative issues
discussed in the text.
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Indeed, research about disparities in victimization risk across race and eth-
nicity—another important axis that separates the advantaged from the dis-
advantaged in the U.S.—has generated significant interest, as scholars have
found that people of color are much more likely to be victimized by crime
than whites (though longitudinal trends in this disparity have not been
studied in detail) (e.g. DiIulio, 1989; Sampson and Lauritsen, 1997; Lauritsen
and White, 2001). Moreover, the broader literature on social stratification
(e.g. the research about health inequality already cited) has invariably fo-
cused on economic and racial disparities in social benefits and burdens.
Because these kinds of inequalities would have special normative signifi-
cance, it is especially important to determine whether they are growing. This
paper focuses on inequality across income groups because income is the most
direct axis that separates the advantaged from the disadvantaged.
2. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON VICTIMIZATION INEQUALITY
Although criminologists have not studied longitudinal trends in vic-
timization inequality, economist Levitt (1999a) recently examined this issue
in a provocative study that seems to have escaped notice in criminology. By
analyzing National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) data, Levitt found
that although the distribution of violent crime across economic groups has
not changed over time, property crime became more concentrated among
the poor from 1974 to 1993. Levitt’s study suggests that the distribution of
victimization may be shifting towards the poor, albeit only among property
crimes, which are generally less serious than violent crimes.
Levitt’s important study can be extended in two ways. First, in his
analysis of NCVS data, Levitt did not account for the 1992 redesign of the
survey. As described elsewhere (Kindermann, et al.,1997), the redesigned
survey uncovered more victimization for almost every social group, and the
increase tended to be greater for those with higher incomes than those with
lower incomes. Consequently, any effort to compare pre-1992 data with
post-1992 data (Levitt compared 1974–1975 data with 1993–1994 data) must
account for the effects of the redesign. While Levitt’s paper raises a signif-
icant and previously neglected question, its findings may not be valid.
Second, although Levitt’s exploratory paper discussed possible expla-
nations for the trends he identified (Levitt, 1999a, pp. 87, 91), it did not test
those explanations directly, so that issue stands out as an important issue for
new research. The limited nature of available data makes it difficult to test
many of the most plausible explanations for changes in victimization
inequality directly, but it is possible to investigate one simple but important
hypothesis: That victimization inequality may change in response to
differential socioeconomic changes across different economic groups. (For
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simplicity, I will focus on income quintiles as the relevant economic groups.)
Since previous research associated with lifestyle and routine activities theo-
ries has shown that victimization risk tends to vary with certain demographic
characteristics (notably age, gender, marital status, residential location, and
income itself) (Meier and Miethe, 1993, pp. 466–470), differing demographic
trends across different income quintiles could cause victimization inequality
to vary. For example, if demographic groups with high risks of victimization
(e.g. the young) became more concentrated among the poor over time, that
change could cause victimization inequality to grow. Similar hypotheses have
played a role in other areas of criminology. For example, differences in
demographic composition have been used to help explain cross-sectional
differences in victimization among racial and ethnic groups (Lauritsen and
White, 2001), and longitudinal research about trends in the level of crime in
the U.S. has investigated the extent to which changes in the age structure of
the population can explain changes in the crime rate (e.g. Levitt, 1999b).
Here, I propose to investigate an analogous hypothesis that I will refer to as
‘‘the demographic change hypothesis’’: that changes in the demographic
structure of different income quintiles can explain changes in victimization
inequality. This hypothesis can be stated more precisely by decomposing
changes in the quintile-specific victimization rates into two components:
(1) The portion due to changes in the demographic composition of each
quintile (i.e. holding the victimization rate for each demographic group
constant), and (2) the portion due to changes in the victimization rate of each
demographic group within the quintiles.4 The demographic change hypoth-
4More formally, any quintile victimization rate can be written as the sum of two or more
group-specific rates within the quintile, each weighted by the proportion of the quintile that is in
that group (e.g.V ¼ Vmale  Pmale þ Vfemale  Pfemale, whereV represents the victimization rate and
P the proportion of the quintile’s population). A change in the overall quintile victimization rate
from 1975 to 1994 could then be written as the weighted average of the gender-specific rates:
DV ¼ V1994  V1975 ¼ ðV1994male  P1994male þ V1994female  P1994femaleÞ
 ðV1975male  P1975male þ V1975female  P1975femaleÞ
which can be manipulated to yield
½ðP1994male  P1975maleÞ  V1994male þ ðP1994female  P1975femaleÞ  V1994female
þ ½P1975male  ðV1994male  V1975maleÞ þ P1975female  ðV1994female  V1975femaleÞ
since expanding products and canceling terms recovers the original expression. The bracketed
expressions correspond to the decompositions described in the text: The left-hand expression is
the portion of the overall change in the victimization rate due to the changing demographic
composition of the quintile, while the right-hand expression is the portion due to the change in
group-specific rates (i.e., the change that would have occurred if the composition had remained
constant). The overall change can also be decomposed in a slightly different way, using 1975’s
group-specific rates rather than 1994’s to calculate the share due to compositional changes and
using 1994’s compositional data rather than 1975’s to calculate the share due to changes in the
group-specific victimization rates. In my analyses, however, the two decompositions give similar
results, so I will not present results from the latter decomposition.
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esis predicts that a large share of any change in victimization inequality will
be due to the first portion of the decomposition.
This potential explanation for trends in victimization inequality is
admittedly not a sociologically deep one: It holds that compositional
changes, rather than any subtle economic or sociological processes, drive
changes in victimization inequality. Nevertheless, it represents an important
possibility in the study of social inequality. Since changes in victimization
inequality have prima facie normative significance for the reasons explained
in the introduction, it would be important to know that those changes have
their sources in demographic changes (rather than, say, the increasing ability
of the wealthy to afford luxuries of self-protection like security devices and
homes in safe neighborhoods—a possibility noted by Levitt ( 1999a, pp. 87,
91). It would be too simple to say that this finding would mean that ob-
served changes in victimization inequality have no normative significance at
all. For example, if changes in marital status composition explained growth
in victimization inequality and the decline of marriage among the poor is a
consequence of their worsening economic situation (Wilson, 1987), then the
growth of victimization inequality would be an unfortunate byproduct of
broader patterns of social stratification, and therefore another reason to be
concerned about those patterns. Nevertheless, a discovery that demographic
composition explains changes in victimization inequality would cast the
normative issues raised by victimization inequality in a particular light, as
discussed further in the conclusion.
Apart from its intrinsic importance, a preliminary analysis of the
demographic change hypothesis can also lay the groundwork for future
studies that explore more complex social processes. If income-specific
demographic changes influence victimization inequality, the next question
becomes how they do so—what causal processes mediate the relationship
between the demographic composition of different income groups and vic-
timization inequality.
3. DATA AND METHODS
To explore these issues, this study investigates two questions: whether
the distribution of different kinds of criminal victimization across income
groups has changed in the U.S. since the early 1970s (Section 4), and
whether demographic shifts in the population have contributed to those
changes by concentrating high-risk groups in lower economic strata (Section
5). The study relies on computerized data from the (NCVS) and its prede-
cessor, the National Crime Survey (NCS), which have been described in
detail elsewhere (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1998–1999), and it also draws on
published reports of those data (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1974–2000). The
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crime surveys rely on interviews with a stratified, multi-stage cluster sample
of U.S. residents using a rotating panel design. Sample size has fluctuated
somewhat since the inception of the NCS, but in 2000, 86,800 households
and 159,420 individuals age 12 or older were interviewed, and the response
rate was 93.4% of eligible households and 89.6% of eligible individuals
(Rennison, 2001).
The study focuses on violent crimes (including assaults, robberies, and
rapes), thefts (including household thefts and motor vehicle thefts), and
burglaries. Thefts and burglaries are analyzed separately because the
nature of inequality for each type of crime is very different. While bur-
glaries (like violent crimes) are concentrated disproportionately among the
poor, household thefts and motor vehicle thefts are concentrated dispro-
portionately among the wealthy (though to a lesser extent than 25 years
ago). Most of the discussion will focus on violent crimes because violence
is the most significant aspect of America’s crime problem (Zimring and
Hawkins, 1997, pp. 1–11 and passim), making inequality in its distribution
particularly important. In addition to the overall violent crime rates, I will
also examine rates for nonstranger violence and stranger violence sepa-
rately.
To assess how the distribution of crime across income groups has
changed over time, I have used published NCVS and NCS data that describe
victimization rates for different income groups from 1974 to 2000 to com-
pute various measures of inequality that compare criminal victimization
across income groups—i.e. groups defined by their degree of social advan-
tage as discussed above. The most important ratio I will use is the ‘‘20-20’’
ratio, defined as the victimization rate for individuals in the poorest 20% of
households divided by the rate for individuals in the wealthiest 20% of
households.5 (In 2000, the 20th percentile household earned $17,950 and the
80th percentile household earned $81,960.) Like all scalar summaries of
two-dimensional distributions, this one obviously has weaknesses, such as
the fact that it is insensitive to changes in victimization at the middle of the
income distribution. But it has the advantages of simplicity and intuitive
interpretation, and a similar approach has been used commonly in studies of
income distribution (e.g. Lerman, 1997). In any case, I will show that more
sophisticated (though also more opaque) measures of inequality suggest the
same patterns as the 20–20 ratio does. In particular, I will use a measure of
5This method of analyzing inequality differs from Levitt’s (1999a), which focused on the vic-
timization rate of groups defined by inflation-adjusted income ranges. For a variety of reasons,
it is more conventional in the literatures about health and income inequality to focus on
quintiles rather than fixed income ranges, so I emphasize that approach here.
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inequality called the concentration index (CI), which is conceptually similar
to the Gini coefficient and has been used extensively by health economists to
measure inequality in health across economic groups (Kakwani, et al.,
1997). As used here, the CI varies from ) 1.0 to 1.0, and as it becomes larger
and more positive, it indicates a higher concentration of victimization
among low-income groups; a CI of zero indicates that every income group is
victimized at the same rate.
The crime surveys make it possible to use these methods to describe
victimization inequality, but only approximately. The surveys do not ask
respondents for exact household incomes. Instead, interviewers ask which
range a household’s income falls into (e.g. $7,500–$9,999), so it is not
possible to identify precisely those households that lie above or below a
particular percentile; some income groups will fall entirely above or be-
low the percentile, but one group will inevitably straddle it. Here, in
order to estimate the victimization rate for households whose income falls
below a given percentile (as reported in the annual Current Population
Survey conducted by the Census Bureau), I will interpolate the contri-
bution of the group that straddles the percentile. (Details are available
from the author.) Similarly, the lack of precise income data means that
the CI must also be approximated, as is often done in the study of other
forms of inequality (Kakwani, et al., 1997, p. 89). These methods for
calculating measures of inequality are unavoidably imprecise, but since I
will show that a variety of different measures converge on the same basic
picture of inequality, it is unlikely that the trends I present result from
interpolation errors.
As I will show, these analyses show that several types of victimization
have become much more concentrated among the poor over the past
25 years. To investigate whether and how income-specific demographic
changes explain those trends, I decompose them according to several
demographic variables and ask, counterfactually, how victimization
inequality would have changed if the demographic composition of each
income group had not. I explain this methodology in more detail (Section 5)
after establishing the nature of the trends in inequality.
4. CHANGES IN VICTIMIZATION INEQUALITY, 1974–2000
Using the methods just described, Fig. 1 and Table I show how the
distribution of criminal victimization across income groups has changed
from 1974 to 2000. These data show that all categories of crime have
become more concentrated among the poorest 20% of households. For
violent crimes, the 20–20 ratio grew from 1.15 during the 1974–1980
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period to 1.76 in the 1994–2000 period (a 53% increase). For burglary,
the 20–20 ratio followed the violent crime changes closely, growing from
an average of 1.12 during the 1974–1980 period to 1.75 during the 1994–
2000 period (a 56% increase). For household theft and motor vehicle
theft, the 20–20 grew by the same factor from a lower base, from an
average of 0.49 during the 1974–1980 period to 0.76 during the 1994–2000
period (a 55% increase). These findings contrast with Levitt’s (1999a)
conclusion that only property crime has become more concentrated
among the poor. Once the effects of the survey redesign have been ac-
counted for (in ways I will describe shortly), it appears that all crimes
have become more concentrated among the poor.
Different measures of inequality offer the same picture as the 20–20
ratio. As shown in Table I, the CI follows the 20–20 ratio closely. For violent
crimes, the CI grew from an average of 0.130 in the 1974–1980 period to an
average of 0.215 in the 1994–2000 period. For burglary, the CI grew from
0.065 to 0.251 during the same period, and the CI for household theft and
motor vehicle theft fell from ) 0.381 to ) 0.109—that is, theft victimization
became more equal by becoming more concentrated among the poor than it
was in the 1970s. Other measures of inequality (not shown in Table I) offer
further confirmation of these patterns: From the 1974–1980 period to the
1994–2000 period, the average 40–40 ratio (which refers to the top and
bottom 40% of households) grew from 1.17 to 1.42 for violent crimes, from
1.12 to 1.55 for burglaries, and from 0.57 to 0.82 for thefts. Finally, the 10–10
ratio (defined similarly) grew from 1.36 to 2.05 for violent crimes, from 1.13
to 1.91 for burglaries, and from 0.51 to 0.76 for thefts between the same two
periods. Thus the changes in inequality are not an artifact of a particular
measurement procedure but are robust across many different measures of
inequality. Moreover, the generally slower growth of the 40–40 ratio com-
pared with the 20–20 and 10–10 ratios is consistent with the idea that the risk
of victimization has become more polarized by income, with a greater gap
separating the poorest from the wealthiest.
Although the concentration of victimization among low-income groups
has grown markedly, even at the end of this period the poor are not dra-
matically more likely than the rich to be victimized by the crimes reported in
the NCVS. For violent crimes, the poorest quintile was about twice as likely
to suffer violent crime victimization as the richest quintile in 2000 (20–20
ratio of 1.92), and the disparity for burglaries was comparable. For house-
hold thefts and motor vehicle thefts, the poor were less likely to be victimized
than the rich for household larcenies in 2000 (20–20 ratio of 0.84), though the
gap has closed considerably since the 1970s. It is important to note, however,
that the crime surveys uncover many crimes that are relatively trivial, and an






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































patterns for ‘‘serious violent crimes’’ as defined by the Bureau of Justice
Statistics (Hart and Rennison, 2003), including rape, robbery, and aggra-
vated assault. Adjusted for effects of the redesign, the 20–20 ratio for serious
violent crimes rose from an average of 1.59 during the 1974–1980 period to
2.54 during the 1994–2000 period, a 60% increase. During the same period,
the 20–20 ratio for all violent crimes—including less-serious simple as-
saults—grew from 1.15 to 1.76, a 53% increase. Thus the risk premium
associated with being poor is twice as large for serious violent crimes as it is
for all violent crimes (154% vs. 76%), and it has grown at a slightly faster
pace. The disparities are especially large at the end of the period: The 20–20
ratio for serious violence reached 3.09 in 1999 and 2.71 in 2000 (up from 1.56
in 1974). In sum, although the poor are not dramatically more likely to be
victimized than the rich for all NCVS crimes, that finding is partly an artifact
of the kinds of (relatively nonserious) crimes reported in the NCVS.
The most important source of uncertainty in these trends is the 1992
redesign of the NCS discussed earlier. Table I accounts for the redesign by
deflating pre-1993 victimization rates by a fixed percentage for each income
quintile, following essentially the same procedure used in published BJS
reports, and finding similar patterns in the overall level of crime (e.g. Rand,
et al., 1997).6 This adjustment reflects the best research that has been done
about the differences between the two surveys, but it may not be entirely valid,
and the small victimization ratios for burglary and violence in the 1970s and
1980s could be an artifact of it. Nevertheless, further analysis suggests that the
apparent trends in inequality shown in Table I reflect real changes in the
distribution of crime, not changes in the crime surveys’ methodology. First,
the same trends are visible if one only looks at unadjusted data before the
redesign, from 1974 to 1992. For example, for violent crime victimization, the
unadjusted 20–20 ratio averaged 1.57 from 1974 to 1979, but from 1987 to
1992 it averaged 2.29—a 46% increase. (In this connection, note that because
I apply the same factors to all pre-1993data, trendsduring those early years are
not affected by my adjustments. In other words, trends within the 1974–1992
time series and within the 1993–2000 time series are both unaffected by my
6The 1992 survey split the national sample in two, using the old survey on half and the new
survey on the other half. Kindermann et al. (1997) analyzed these data to estimate ratios that
capture the difference between the two surveys for various demographic groups, including
income groups. To make the pre-1993 survey results comparable to more recent surveys,
I applied these ratios to the NCS-reported income groups in 1992 and then calculated how
much this adjustment inflated the rates for each income quintile in that year, deriving scaling
factors for each quintile that would make pre-1993 data comparable to recent data. My
analysis also accounts for the different ways in which the NCS and the NCVS treated thefts.
Until 1992, larceny/thefts could be classified as either crimes against individuals or as crimes
against households, but after that time they were mostly treated as crimes against households.
For the earlier years, I have recomputed larceny/thefts against individuals as household thefts.
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adjustments; the adjustments simply make the earlier time series comparable
to the later one. Since the trends in both series are generally upward, it is clear
that inequality has grown.) Second, the trend also does not change for more
serious crimes, as noted in the previous paragraph. In general, changes in
survey methodology (including the wholesale redesign in 1992 and less sub-
stantial changes such as greater use of telephone reports over time) have larger
effects on reports of minor crimes than on reports of serious crimes (Kinder-
mann, et al., 1997, p. 2). If changes in surveymethodology caused the apparent
changes in victimization inequality described here, then inequality would
change more slowly (or not at all) among more serious crimes. In fact, the
opposite happened—inequality grew more rapidly for serious violent crimes.
Victimization inequality also grewmore rapidly for violent crimes reported to
police, another subset of crimes that was not affected as strongly by the re-
design (Kindermann, et al., 1997, p. 2). For example, from 1975 to 2000, the
20–20 ratio for violent crimes reported to the police (not shown in Table I)
grew from1.30 to 2.46, a 90% increase; during the sameperiod, the 20–20 ratio
for all violent crimes rose from 1.18 to 1.92, a 63% increase. Thus victimiza-
tion inequality grew more rapidly and reached a higher level for crimes re-
ported to the police.Aswith the trends for serious violence, that is the opposite
ofwhatwould be expected if the trends shown inTable I resulted fromchanges
in survey methodology rather than real trends in inequality.
Finally, sampling error also cannot explain the apparent growth in
inequality. The 20–20 ratios presented in Table I are estimates based on
sample data, so they may not capture the true value of the 20–20 at any
point in time. Nevertheless, the 95% confidence intervals on Fig. 1 show
that every estimated 20–20 ratio during the 1990s is statistically different
from every 20–20 during the 1970s at the 0.05 level.7 Moreover, this kind of
7I calculated pointwise confidence intervals and standard errors for the 20–20 ratios in three
steps. First, I estimated standard errors for the quintile-specific victimization rates using the
generalized variance procedure developed for the crime surveys by the Bureau of Justice
Statistics (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 1999). Second, for each type of crime, I generated estimates of
the correlation of the quintiles using their empirical correlation over time. Finally, using the
estimated quintile variances and their estimated correlation, I estimated the standard error for
each ratio with a parametric bootstrap using 100,000 repetitions under the assumption of joint
normality (Johnston and DiNardo, 1997). I allowed for uncertainty in the estimate of the
correlation coefficient by drawing it from its estimated sampling distribution, using the Fisher
transformation. Complete data on standard errors is available from the author. I thank John
DiNardo for help making these calculations.
Note that because of the survey redesign, year-to-year comparisons of the sort described in the
text are not technically valid after 1992; in comparing recent data to older data, the most
important source of uncertainty is not the fact that each estimate comes from a random sample
but the fact that the survey methodology changed. Nevertheless, the statement in the text holds
for pre-redesign data as well. For example, a T-test comparing the 1974 20–20 with the 1991
20–20 shows that the latter ratio is indeed larger (p < 0.05).
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comparison between a single recent year and the average from an earlier
decade is extremely conservative as a test of whether the apparent
changes in Table I are real rather than a result of sampling error.
What needs to be explained is not just why the 1991 ratio (for example)
is larger than the ratios during the 1970s, but why there is a consis-
tent upward trend throughout the 1980s. Given the consistent patterns
over time—e.g. every estimated 20–20 ratio during the 1990s is larger
than every estimated 20–20 ratio during the 1970s—unrepresentative
random samples could not have generated the apparent growth in
inequality.
4.1. Stranger Violence and Nonstranger Violence
The discussion so far reveals similar patterns across all types of crime,
in the sense that violent crime, burglary, and theft have all become more
concentrated among the poor to a similar extent. But further analysis
reveals differences within these broad categories. In particular, victimiza-
tion inequality has followed different trends for violence committed by
strangers compared with violence committed by intimates or acquain-
tances. (Since victims of property crime rarely see the people who vic-
timized them, this kind if analysis cannot be undertaken for theft or
burglary.) Analysis of computerized data from the crime surveys (not
shown in Table I) shows that the 20–20 ratio for stranger violence grew
only marginally, from 1.01 in 1975 to 1.15 in 2000, while the ratio for
violent crimes where the victim knew the offender grew more dramatically,
from 1.51 in 1975 to 2.79 in 2000. These figures indicate that much of the
growth in victimization inequality for violent crimes has been concentrated
in nonstranger crime.
Here especially the redesign of the victimization survey makes it
difficult to interpret these figures. As explained above, I adjusted the NCS
data from 1975 using factors derived from Kindermann, et al., (1997),
but those factors were designed to adjust income-specific victimization
rates for all violent crimes, and here I have applied them to subsets of
the data—to nonstranger crimes and to stranger crimes. Although no
better procedure is readily available, this approach is not technically
valid, so it distorts the analysis to some unknown degree. Once again,
one way to investigate the significance of this problem is to look at data
for crimes that the redesign did not affect as strongly, such as crimes
reported to the police. Doing that confirms the basic conclusion in the
previous paragraph. Looking only at unadjusted data for violent crimes
reported to the police, the 20–20 ratio for stranger violence fell from 1.26
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to 1.24 between 1975 and 2000, while the ratio for intimate and
acquaintance violence rose from 2.68 to 4.16.
In sum, although the redesign makes it impossible to estimate the
trends for nonstranger and stranger crimes with precision, the general
pattern seems clear: Victimization inequality has grown more rapidly for
nonstranger violence than stranger violence. In any case, since post-1992
data do not need to be adjusted, the most recent disparities are fairly
certain: In 2000, the 20–20 was much larger for nonstranger violence than
stranger violence.
4.2. Income-Specific Trends in Victimization
Although the growth in victimization inequality is potentially trou-
bling, it is also important to note the positive trends in the group-specific
rates. In the long haul, Table I shows that victimization risk has fallen in
all quintiles. The growth in inequality has not resulted from growth in
victimization among the poor but from especially large drops in victim-
ization among the wealthy. For example, the violent crime victimization
rate for the poorest quintile fell from 62.6 per 1,000 during the 1974–1980
period (adjusted for NCS-NCVS differences) to 55.0 per 1,000 during the
1994–2000 period (a drop of 11.6, or 12%), but the same rate for the
richest quintile fell more rapidly, from 54.4 to 31.8 (a drop of 22.6, or
42%). (Both changes are statistically significant at the 0.05 level, but see
the caution at the end of footnote).7 Victimization rates fell three-and-
a-half times faster for the rich compared with the poor, but they fell for
both groups.
5. CAN DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE EXPLAIN THE GROWTH
OF VICTIMIZATION INEQUALITY?
Having established the nature of the trends in victimization inequality
in the last section, this section investigates whether changing demographics
have contributed to those trends in two steps. First, to offer an intuitive
basis for my central analysis, I begin with brief bivariate analyses that ex-
plore how each of several specific aspects of demographic change contrib-
uted to the growth in victimization inequality for violent crime. I then move
on to a multivariate analysis that explores the simultaneous effects of all
these demographic changes on the trends in victimization inequality for
violence, burglary, and theft.
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5.1. Bivariate Analysis
To analyze the effect of quintile-specific changes in demographic
composition on the trends in victimization inequality, I first used the
computerized data from the 1975 and 1994 crime surveys to cross-tabu-
late victimization by income on the one hand, and age, marital status,
employment status, and residential location (urban, rural, or suburban)
on the other, since those are some of the major demographic groups that
have been found to have high risks of criminal victimization in past
research (Meier and Miethe, 1993, pp. 466–470).8 Moreover, because
income itself is associated with victimization risk, I also tabulated data
about quintile-specific income changes between 1975 and 1994. Table II
presents the relevant data, focusing on the group-specific victimization
rates for each quintile and the demographic composition of each quintile.
Table II shows that demographic changes in the U.S. since 1974 are
consistent with the demographic change hypothesis, in that the demo-
graphic composition of each quintile did change in directions that would
be expected to exacerbate victimization inequality. For example, the
percentage of individuals in the poorest quintile who were in the high-risk
15–24 year-old age group fell only slightly from 1975 to 1994 (from 26%
to 24% of the quintile’s population) while the percentage of the richest
quintile in that age group fell rapidly (from 21% to 16%). Ceteris paribus,
these trends would be expected to cause victimization to fall slightly for
the poor and more rapidly for the rich, so victimization would become
more concentrated among the poor. Similarly, both the proportion of
individuals that lived in urban areas and the proportion that was
unmarried grew among the poor while falling among the wealthy, and
8The analyses omit race as an explanatory variable for a variety of reasons. Most simply, trends
in the racial composition of each quintile cannot explain the growing concentration of vic-
timization among the poor because they have moved in the wrong direction: From 1975 to
1994, the proportion of the richest quintile that was black grew slightly (from 4.1% to 5.0%),
and the proportion of the poorest quintile that was black fell considerably (from 23.4% to
17.9%). Since blacks are a high-victimization group, these trends would be expected to reduce
the concentration of victimization among the poor, not increase it. In any case, if race is
included in the multivariate analysis presented later, its coefficient is not statistically significant
at the 0.10 level, and the overall model predictions change by less than 5%. It is not surprising
that race has little additional explanatory power: Past research has shown that a substantial
share of racial disparities in victimization can be explained with the kinds of demographic
variables I do include (e.g. Lauritsen and White, 2001).
In these analyses, I chose to analyze 1994 data because that was the most recent year for which
the necessary person-level and incident-level extract files were available when I began this
research. I chose 1975 as a base year because it begins the 20-year period that ends in 1994. In
any case, these 2 years seem to be good representatives of their respective decades in the sense
that the overall 20–20 ratio for each year lies close to the midpoint for its decade.
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these changes would also be expected to cause victimization inequality to
grow. Finally, between 1975 and 1994 the top quintile’s income outpaced
inflation dramatically (growing 207%, from $20,496 to $62,841) while the
bottom quintile’s income grew only slightly faster than inflation (growing
167%, from $5,025 to $13,426). These changes might mean that the poor
have become less able relative to the rich to afford the luxuries of self-
protection, such as security devices and homes in safe neighborhoods.
Ceteris paribus, that kind of change could also cause victimization to
become more concentrated among the poor.
Table III refines these intuitions in two steps. First, in the left panel, the
table shows how the victimization rates for each quintile would have
changed if specific aspects of its demographic composition had remained
constant, assuming that the relationship between demography and victim-
ization risk had changed in the way it actually did (as described in foot-
note).4 Second, in the right panel, it uses those hypothetical rates to
calculate how the 20–20 ratios would have changed under those conditions.
Table II. Population composition and victimization rates for richest and poorest quintiles, by
age, marital status, employment status, and residential location, 1975 and 1994
Population composition Violent crime victimization per 1,000
Poorest quintile Richest quintile Poorest quintile Richest quintile
1975 1994 1975 1994 1975 1994 1975 1994
Aged 15–24 26% 24% 21% 16% 123.0 129.2 100.5 91.4
Other ages 74% 76% 79% 84% 41.7 51.1 40.2 33.1
Married 39% 30% 64% 66% 36.0 35.5 30.7 21.5
Not married 60% 69% 36% 34% 80.6 85.0 93.4 82.8
Male 41% 43% 51% 52% 85.1 78.1 73.0 52.2
Female 59% 57% 49% 48% 47.7 64.0 32.3 31.3
Working 34% 40% 61% 74% 78.2 93.0 51.3 39.8
Not working 59% 50% 26% 16% 51.2 42.6 36.3 26.2
Urban 34% 38% 26% 23% 90.2 82.7 67.5 48.2
Suburban 35% 31% 53% 65% 67.6 89.2 50.5 37.5
Rural 31% 31% 21% 12% 28.3 35.7 41.6 56.4
Quintile boundaries Ratio of 80th percentile income
to 20th percentile income
20th %ile income 80th %ile income
1975 1994 1975 1994 1975 1994
Quintile boundary $5,025 $13,426 $20,496 $62,841 4.08 4.68
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(Though conceptually similar, the income analyses proceed somewhat dif-
ferently, as explained in a footnote.)9
These analyses show that changing demographics explain a respectable
but not overwhelming share of the trends in inequality for violent crimes.
Some demographic changes were too small to account for much of the
growth in the 20–20 ratio. The relative drop in the proportion of the poorest
quintile that was female was fairly small, and changes in gender composition
account for essentially none of the growth in inequality. Other demographic
changes, however, appear to have a stronger connection with the growth in
victimization inequality. Most dramatically, the proportion of the poorest
quintile that was unmarried grew rapidly while the same proportion
declined slightly in the richest quintile, and these changes account for almost
a third of the overall growth in inequality. Finally, the fact that the bottom
quintile’s income increasingly lagged behind that of the rich explains one-
tenth of the growth in victimization inequality for violence. For brevity,
I omit comparable analyses of the trends in inequality for theft and bur-
glary, but those analyses (available from the author) give similar results:
Individual changes in demographic composition explain a moderate share of
the trends in victimization inequality for all three types of crime.
5.2. Multivariate Analysis
These analyses are essentially bivariate, in the sense that each one iso-
lates the contribution of a single type of demographic change to the trends in
victimization inequality. In reality, however, these demographic changes are
likely to interact with one another to influence quintile-specific victimization
rates, so only a multivariate analysis can investigate their joint effects
9In the counterfactual scenario for the income analysis, I asked what the bottom quintile’s
victimization rate would have been in 1994 if the 20th percentile income had grown as fast as
the 80th percentile income since 1975 (i.e. by 207% to $15,407, rather than by 167% to
$13,426), assuming that income-specific risks of victimization remained the same as their actual
1994 values. To calculate this predicted victimization rate under the counterfactual scenario,
I returned to the raw data that underlie Table I and recalculated the bottom quintile’s vic-
timization rate using the counterfactual 20th percentile income (rather than the actual 20th
percentile income, which is what I used to calculate the bottom quintile’s victimization rate in
1994 in Table I). Doing that meant weighting the bottom quintile’s victimization rate more
heavily with the lower victimization rates of somewhat wealthier income groups (i.e. those
earning between $13,426 and $15,407). Though it proceeds somewhat differently, this method
is analogous to the method used for other quintile-specific demographic changes. (For
example, one could ‘‘decompose’’ the bottom quintile’s victimization rate into a weighted sum
of the rates for two income groups: The group earning less than $13,426 and the group earning
between $13,426 and $15,407. In reality, the proportion of the bottom quintile’s population in
the second group was 0% in 1994; under the counterfactual scenario, it is not.)
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adequately. To investigate the combined contribution of all demographic
changes to the trends in victimization inequality, I modeled the relationships
between demographic characteristics and victimization risk in 1994 using
multivariate models and then used those models to generate another set of










Actual violent crime victimization rate or ratio 70.1 42.5 1.65
% change from 1975 value (as shown Table I) 11% )20% 40%
If age composition had not changeda 71.5 45.5 1.57
% change from 1975 value 14% )14% 32%
% of growth due to changes in age composition
b )21% 31% 19%
If marital status composition had not changeda 65.5 43.2 1.52
% change from 1975 value 4% )18% 28%




If gender composition had not changeda 69.7 41.9 1.66
% change from 1975 value 11% )21% 40%




If employment composition had not changeda 64.9 42.0 1.55
% change from 1975 value 3% )21% 30%




If geographic composition (urban, suburban, rural)
had not changeda
70.4 44.3 1.59
% change from 1975 value 12% )16% 34%




If 20th %ile income had grown as fast as 80th %ile
incomec
68.1 42.2 1.61
% change from 1975 value 8% )20% 36%
% of growth due to changes in relative incomes 27% 0% 10%
aVictimization rates ‘‘if composition had not changed’’ were calculated by weighting
group-specific victimization rates for 1994 by each group’s share of the population in 1975.
Table II contains the relevant data.
b % of growth due to compositional changes is the actual growth minus the hypothetical
(composition-constant) growth, divided by the actual growth. Negative values indicate
victimization would have grown more than it actually did if composition had remained
constant.
c See text, footnote 9 for details.
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counterfactual predicted values: estimates of what the quintile-specific vic-
timization rate would have been for each type of crime if all modeled aspects
of each quintile’s demographic composition had not changed since 1975 (cf.
Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973 for similar approaches used in labor economics).
To do that, it is first necessary to estimate a version of the following equation,
which relates the demographic characteristics of individuals (or households
in the case of property crimes) to their level of victimization in that year:
V1994 ¼ X1994 b1994 þ e ð1Þ
where V1994 is a vector describing the number of victimizations for every
individual (or household) in 1994, X1994 is a matrix describing the demo-
graphic characteristics of every individual (or household) in 1994, and b1994
is a vector of coefficients relating demographic characteristics to victimiza-
tion risk. The estimate for b1994 can then be applied to the observed
demographic characteristics of each individual (or household) in 1975 to
generate predicted values under the counterfactual scenario—estimates of
what the quintile victimization rates would have been for each type of crime
if each quintile’s demographic composition had not changed since 1975 but
the victimization equation (i.e. the relationship between demography and
victimization risk) had changed in the way it actually did. Formally, that is
accomplished by calculating:
V̂counterfactual ¼ X1975 b̂1994 ð2Þ
and then estimating the quintile victimization rates in the usual fashion (as
described in section 3), using V̂counterfactual rather than V1975 to tabulate the
victimization rate for each income group. The result describes the distri-
bution of victimization that would occur if every individual in the 1975
population suffered the same risk of victimization as his or her exact
demographic counterparts in 1994 did.
To estimate Eq. (1), I focused on the demographic characteristics
mentioned previously using six variables: Young, Female, Married, Work-
ing, Residential Location, and Quintile. For violent crimes, where the vic-
tims are individuals, young, female, married, and working are dichotomous
variables indicating whether an individual is 15–24 years old, female, mar-
ried, and employed, respectively; residential location refers to dummy
variables indicating whether the individual lives in an urban center, a sub-
urb, or a rural area; and quintile describes the individual’s household in-
come, from the poorest quintile (1) to the richest (5). For burglaries and
thefts, where the victims are households, Quintile and urban are defined the
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same way as for individuals, and Female is omitted (households have no
gender). Married, Young, and Employed indicate whether anyone in the
household is married, aged 15–24, or employed.
The most appropriate model for this analysis is a negative binomial
regression of victimization on each of the independent variables, since the
negative binomial technique was developed specifically for data in which the
dependent variable is a number of events and the majority of observations
are zeros (Greene, 1997, p. 939).10 All variables are entered as linear terms
except quintile, which is entered as its natural logarithm because victim-
ization tends to decrease nonlinearly with income. In addition to these
individual terms, several interaction terms might appear to be relevant for
these models, including the obvious interaction between marital status and
age and the interaction between residential location and income quintile
(since income affects residential choice and vice versa). As it turns out,
however, few such interactions are statistically significant, and their collin-
earity both with each other and with the linear terms makes the coefficients
on several terms unstable. In any case, these interactions do not affect the
model predictions (as discussed below), so I excluded them from the final
model for simplicity.
Table IV shows the coefficients of the best-fitting equations that result
when Eq. (1) is estimated for each type of crime in 1994. Nearly all of the
coefficients are statistically significant and have the expected effects on
victimization (e.g. ceteris paribus, the young are generally victimized more
than the old, the unmarried more than the married, and the poor more than
the wealthy) suggesting that the models have been reasonably well-specified.
For violent crimes, applying the coefficients in Table IV to the 1975 dataset
(using a version of Eq. (2) to do so) yields a victimization rate of 61.9 per
1,000 residents in the poorest quintile and a rate of 45.4 per 1,000 in the
richest quintile, for a 20–20 ratio of 1.36. That finding indicates that if the
demographic composition of each quintile had remained constant since 1975
while the relationship between demographic characteristics and victimiza-
tion risk changed in the way that it actually did, the 20–20 ratio for violent
crimes would have grown to only 1.36 instead of 1.66; 62% of the growth in
victimization inequality would have been avoided. Similarly, under those
conditions the 20–20 ratio for theft would have grown to only 0.61 rather
10To estimate and apply the models, each record must be weighted by the number of
person-years it represents (all interviews cover 6-month reporting periods, and interviews are
conducted throughout the year, so each interview reports victimizations for 0–50% of a given
calendar year). It is also necessary to account for the fact that due to the design of the crime
surveys, some records are not statistically independent of each other. Details of these meth-
odological issues are available from the author.
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than 0.71 (48% of the growth avoided), and the ratio for burglary would
have grown to only 1.52 rather than 1.78 (39% for the growth avoided).
To test the robustness of these findings, I investigated alternative model
specifications (including OLS regression, logistic regression, and models that
included several interaction terms) as well as alternative measures of the
household variables (e.g. measuring age as the number of people in the
household aged 15–24, rather than as a dichotomous variable indicating
whether any member of the household fell into that age range). None of
these alternative specifications changed any of the predicted values for the
20–20 under the counterfactual scenario by more than 6%. Quintile-specific
changes in demographic composition seem to explain a large share of the
trends in victimization inequality.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has shown that the decline in crime that the United States
has experienced over the past three decades has not been shared equally: The
wealthy have enjoyed the benefits of this decline much more than the poor
have. That finding confirms and extends the similar finding first noticed by
Levitt (1999a), showing that once the effects of the redesign of the NVCS are
taken into account, all crime types, not just property crimes, have become
more concentrated among the poor. As of 2000, theft victimization remains
slightly more concentrated among the richest quintile than the poorest
Table IV. Multivariate relationships between demographic variables and victimization risks
Incidence rate ratiosa
Variable Violent crimes Burglary Theft
Suburban 0.862* 0.790* 0.809*
Rural 0.589* 0.577* 0.568*
Working 2.004* 1.498* 2.677*
Work status unknown 2.876* 1.684* 2.392*
Married 0.429* 0.748* 1.033
Marital status unknown 1.277 2.181 1.026
Young 1.888* 1.599* 1.967*
Ln(quintile) 0.775* 0.745* 1.058**
Female 0.779* N/A N/A
Negative binomial regression predicting number of victimizations by crime type, 1994.
*p<0.01; **p<0.05.
aEstimated coefficients for the binomial regression have been transformed into incidence rate
ratio to facilitate interpretation. For every variable except quintile, the IRR shows the ratio
(ceteris paribus) of victimization risk for those who have the relevant characteristic to the risk
for those who do not. For In(quintile), it show the effect on victimization risk of a one unit
change in In (quintile).
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quintile (though the gap has closed considerably since the 1970s), but violent
crime and burglary—the two most serious types of crime studied here—are
much more concentrated among the poor, and the disparity has grown
considerably over the past 25 years. For the most serious violent crimes, the
disparity between rich and poor has become quite large. For example, in
2000, the poorest quintile was nearly three times as likely as the richest
quintile to be victimized by ‘‘serious violent crimes’’ as defined by the Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics.
In sum, it is apparent that trends in the distribution of criminal vic-
timization have reinforced other trends in social inequality, such as the
trends in income and health inequality (Levy and Murnane, 1992; Pappas
et al., 1993). The good news is that all groups have seen their rates of
victimization fall; the rates have simply fallen much faster for the rich than
for the poor. The bad news is that the gains of the poorest quintile seem
fragile and relatively small; for example, their rates of violent crime vic-
timization did not dip below 1974 levels until 1995 (and until 1998 they
remained within 8% of the 1974 figure), while rates for the richest quintile
have stayed below their 1974 level since 1983, and by 2000 they were down
by 57%. In any case, the growing concentration of victimization among the
poorest quintile appears to be associated with demographic changes in each
income group. Compared with the richest quintile, the poorest quintile be-
came younger, more urban, more likely to be unmarried, and poorer—all
characteristics associated with high-victimization rates—from 1975 to 1994.
These changes account for a large share of the trends in victimization
inequality, though one-third remains unexplained.
These findings call for three kinds of additional research encompassing
descriptive, normative, and explanatory scholarship. First, to confirm the
finding that victimization has truly become more concentrated among the
poor, it would be useful to analyze datasets other than the NCVS. The
trends described here do seem robust, particularly since the trends in
inequality persist even when focusing on more serious crimes, which are less
affected by peculiarities of survey design. Still, it is possible that subtle
changes in survey design account for some of the apparent trends in vic-
timization inequality. Other data sources, such as police or hospital
admissions data, may offer ways to explore this possibility (cf. Levitt, 1999a,
pp. 91–95). In the case of police data, detailed information about victim
characteristics is rarely available, but it may be possible to geocode criminal
incident data to make reasonable guesses about those characteristics (cf.
Meehan and Ponder, 2001).
Second, the findings in this paper indicate a need for normative analysis
to distinguish troubling inequalities from less significant inequalities. Three
questions deserve special attention. First, should inequality per se should be
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a matter of concern even when all groups are becoming better off in an
absolute sense? Any answer to this question will need to take account of the
causes of inequality. If growing concentration of crime among the poor had
anything to do with public policies, it is probably normatively significant
even if the poor’s victimization risk is falling, since public policy that ben-
efited the wealthy three-and-a-half times as much as it benefited the poor
would likely be inequitable (but see Rawls, 1971, pp. 60 ff. for a possible
exception). On the other hand, if policy did not contribute to these trends,
relative inequality may not be troubling. The fact that demographic change
explains a large share of the growth in victimization inequality for the most
serious crimes (i.e. violence) suggests that the latter conclusion is more
appropriate, but it is important to emphasize that more than one-third of
that growth remains unexplained, so it remains possible that policy played a
role. A second normative question raised by this research is whether
inequality is normatively significant if it is explained by demographic
changes in each quintile. Again, any answer to this question will need to
draw careful distinctions. On one hand, victimization inequality associated
with different age distributions in each quintile may not be normatively
significant since much of it will even out over the life course (cf. Daniels,
1996). If so, empirical research about victimization inequality should
arguably focus on some measure of an individual’s lifetime risk of victim-
ization, asking whether lifetime risk has become more unequal across eco-
nomic groups. On the other hand, victimization inequality associated with
differences in marital status composition across quintiles may be more
troubling, since the breakup of the family in lower income groups is argu-
ably not something that will even out over the life course or something that
has been freely chosen (Wilson, 1987). Finally, Levitt (1999a) suggests a
third normative question relevant to this research: How should the costs of
self-protective behavior be weighed against the costs of victimization per se
in calculating the extra burden that crime places on the poor? Levitt argues
that ‘‘any measure of the burden of crime should incorporate not only
the costs of those victimized, but also the investment made to avoid
victimization’’ (1999a, p. 88). The position is a plausible one, but it is
important to note that literature about other forms of stratification has not
generally attended to indirect burdens of this kind. (For example, students
of income inequality focus on income without recognizing that lower income
may sometimes be compensated by more leisure, and students of health
inequality focus on health outcomes without recognizing that poor health
may be ‘‘compensated’’ by lower expenditures on health care or a more
indulgent lifestyle.) In any case, Levitt’s position suggests a view of dis-
tributive justice that focuses on the distribution of overall well-being, of
which victimization risk and expenditures on self-protection are inter-
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changeable components. An alternative view of distributive justice focuses
on the distribution of specific goods that have special importance to all
individuals (e.g. Rawls, 1971, pp. 62, 90 ff.); neighborhood safety may have
that kind of intrinsic importance. The choice between these two views, and
the proper interpretation of each as applied to the problem of victimization
inequality, is a complex normative issue that deserves further analysis.
In sum, the key point is that there is a need for further normative
analysis that can help to clarify the forms of inequality that should be most
troubling (such as those that do not even out over the life course, those that
do not stem from free choices, and those that persist despite the use of
appropriate self-protective measures) in order to guide empirical analysis to
the most significant problems. Just as explanatory research needs to be
guided by causal theories that identify potentially important independent
variables, descriptive research needs to be guided by normative theories that
identify potentially important dependent variables (Zald, 1991). This paper
already draws from one theory of that kind—the idea that inequality in the
distribution of a social burden is significant when it exacerbates inequalities
of other origins (Walzer, 1973; Barr and Pease, 1990; Miller, 1995). But
future research should try to supplement that basic idea, perhaps in the ways
the previous paragraph has suggested, in order to develop a more nuanced
normative theory relevant to the distribution of criminal victimization.
Finally, there is a need to develop and test causal theories that can
explain the growth in victimization inequality. This paper has shown that
one simple explanation is consistent with recent U.S. trends: Demographic
change has exacerbated victimization inequality by concentrating high-risk
groups in the lower economic strata. Nevertheless, although that explana-
tion can account for two-thirds of the growth in victimization inequality for
violent crimes from 1975 to 1994 and a large share of the trends for burglary
and theft, it is not an especially deep explanation sociologically (much like
the models that explain changes in aggregate crime rates with reference to
changes in the population’s age structure). Future work should try to enrich
this theory by investigating why demographic change is associated with
changes in victimization inequality—i.e. by investigating the variables that
mediate that relationship, such as self-protective behavior and contact with
offenders.
In any case, successful explanations for the trends in victimization
inequality will need to be consistent with the basic facts about those
trends that this paper has uncovered: That the concentration of victim-
ization among the poor began to grow in the early 1980s, that this
growth has been concentrated in nonstranger crimes rather than stranger
crimes, and that it has been associated with quintile-specific changes in
demographic composition. Lifestyle and routine activity theories offer one
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possibility. Those theories suggest that a group’s victimization rate will be
influenced by the lifestyle and daily routines of its members (Meier and
Miethe, 1993). Many of the demographic patterns noted here are con-
sistent with this view: Groups that have traditionally been identified with
high-risk routine activities (such as the young and the unmarried, who
spend more time in public and come into contact with motivated
offenders more often) have become more concentrated in lower income
groups. That shift suggests that on average, the lifestyles and routines
activities of lower income groups may have changed in ways that are
associated with higher rates of victimization. The NCVS did not measure
routine activities directly until 1992, so it is not possible to determine
whether routine activities have changed in each quintile since the 1970s.
Nevertheless, cross-sectional research (e.g., research across U.S. regions
or between the U.S. and other nations) and more limited longitudinal
research since 1992 could shed some light on the ability of lifestyle and
routine activity theory to explain variation in victimization inequality.
Perhaps the most interesting lifestyle-related explanation for the trends in
victimization inequality is one that views those trends as intimately
bound up with broader patterns of social stratification, which may have
increasingly insulated the rich from contact with potential offenders—e.g.
via greater withdrawal of the rich into safe, class-segregated neighbor-
hoods and work environments (cf. Hindelang, et al., 1978) or via greater
stratification of social networks by income. The high levels and rates of
growth of inequality among intimate and acquaintance violence suggest
that the latter possibility may be especially important.
Another possible explanation for the growth in victimization
inequality for violent crimes is suggested by its timing and by its con-
centration in nonstranger crimes: Tougher criminal justice policy could
have fueled victimization inequality because its deterrent value varies with
the economic status of the potential offender, and therefore in some cases
with the economic status of the potential victim. As John Braithwaite and
others have argued, those who have a strong stake in conformity are
more likely to be deterred by formal criminal sanctions than those who
have a weaker stake in conformity (Braithwaite, 1989; Sherman and
Smith, 1992). This idea is particularly important in the context of the
United States during the late twentieth century, which markedly increased
its use of the criminal sanction by incarcerating more offenders for longer
periods of time (beginning particularly in the early 1980s, when victim-
ization inequality also began to grow). If Braithwaite is right, a policy
change like that may deter wealthier offenders more than poorer
offenders, since correlates of economic status (like lack of employment
and low educational or occupational aspirations) are associated with a
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low stake in conformity (Braithwaite, 1989). Such growing concentration
of criminal offending in lower-income groups would cause growing con-
centration of victimization there for certain types of crime—namely,
crimes where victims and offenders tend to come from the same economic
class (as in the case of intimate and acquaintance violence, much of
which is intra-class by definition). If there is any truth to this hypothesis,
it could have important policy implications. Many proponents of tough
criminal justice policies have defended them partly on the grounds that
they protect the disadvantaged, who are victimized by crime more than
anyone else (e.g. DiIulio, 1989). But if tough crime policy produces
inegalitarian results, it is at best inefficient and at worst counterproduc-
tive from that perspective.
This particular theory about how criminal justice policy might influence
victimization inequality is of course highly speculative. I mention it here
only to offer an example of an important possibility that deserves theoretical
and empirical attention: that public policy may play an important role in
shaping the distribution of victimization. Whether or not this particular
theory has any validity, the findings of this paper indicate a need for policy
research with that kind of distributional focus—research that explores not
just whether specific policy interventions reduce the overall level of victim-
ization but also how the benefits of those interventions are distributed. Such
research is particularly important today because even more than in the past,
crime has increasingly become a distinctive problem of the poor rather than
a problem for society in general.
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